International negotiation is a dynamic process. Outcomes develop from patterned exchanges between negotiating parties and their constituencies. Of particular interest to analysts is the challenge of depicting these patterns. Some prefer sequential stage models (Douglas 1957; Zartman 1975; Gulliver 1979; Pruitt 1981; Druckman 1983 ), although they differ on just how the stages should be characterized. Others propose cyclical models in which monitoring and learning are central (Coddington 1968; Snyder and Diesing 1977; Cross 1983 ). For both, however, the guiding question is to explain the relationship between processes and outcomes. Central to this explanation is the idea of turning points or events that move the process on a trajectory toward or away from agreement. This article is an attempt to increase the usefulness of turning points as an empirical concept. It consists of a large-sample comparative analysis of negotiation processes.' Central to the analysis is an effort to identify factors that influence the occurrence and consequences of turning points.
ing process: precipitants, process departures, and consequences.2 Process departures are considered to be turning points precipitated by certain events with consequences for progress toward or away from agreement.
The previous studies do, however, suggest hypotheses about a relationship between types of negotiation and factors that precipitate the occurrence of turning points. In the negotiations that dealt with security issues, turning points were driven primarily by external events. The resolution of the base-rights issues between Spain and the United States was facilitated by high-level diplomatic activity and leadership succession crises (Druckman 1986 ). Progress in the INF talks between the Soviet Union and the United States occurred as a result of decisions made in consultation with France and Great Britain, a delinking of the issues from the START agenda, and summit politics between the national leaders (Druckman, Husbands, and Johnston 1991).
In contrast, progress in the negotiations that dealt with trade or environmental issues was due more to procedural and substantive influences than external events. Tomlin's (1989) analysis of the prenegotiation rounds of the North American Free Trade talks called attention to the role of new ideas about what will be negotiated and how to negotiate those issues to bring about turning points. More recently, Cameron and Tomlin (2000) showed how procedural innovations contributed to progress in the NAFTA talks involving Mexico, Canada, and the United States. Similarly, Chesek's (1997, 455) analysis of environmental negotiation cases led her to conclude that "the negotiations are guided from phase to phase through turning points that are often motivated by procedural events." The convening of specialized working groups, the use of time pressures, and consensus-building procedures (including postponement of a decision on some difficult issues) were instrumental in bringing about turning points. So too were such substantive breakthroughs as a realization by all parties of the importance of addressing the issues and separating peripheral from core concerns. A distinction among these cases is between the external events that precipitated turning points in the security negotiations and the internal processes that influenced progress in the trade and environmental cases.
These observations may reflect a difference in the way that governments approach security issues as compared with the way they deal with trade, environmental, or other political issues. Security issues have been negotiated in the context of adversarial relationships between nations. Referred to by Strauss (1978) as antagonistic negotiations, security talks (including arms control) are often protracted, difficult, increasingly antagonistic, marked by mutual distrust, and seem to contain elements of false rather than genuine bargaining. Acting strategically, security negotiators are cognizant of the connection between a shifting balance of power among their nations and the shifting balance that obtains within the negotiations (Druckman 1980) . A cautious approach is reflected in slow progress toward outcomes that often takes the form of small incremental adjustments. (See Hopmann [1996] for examples of cases.) Governments are risk averse when dealing with their own security and reluctant to alter the status quo or take bold initiatives; the exception to this pattern of course was Gorbachev's nuclear and troop reduction initiatives during the latter part of the 1980s.
Writing about security regimes, Jervis (1983, 190 ) noted that the superpowers do not take account of each other's security requirements, look to the long run, or develop rules and expectations of restraint... (it is unlikely that they would develop) the sorts of cooperative understandings that help ameliorate political conflicts across a broad range of issues.
The lack of such understandings renders the idea of a security regime implausible. As a result, security negotiators have little control over the process and few opportunities to create the conditions for turning points that move the talks forward. Progress may depend more on the influence of external events or interventions.
Unlike security issues, trade and environmental negotiations have benefited from the kind of expectations of cooperation and restraint provided by international regimes. The regime provides an institutional context for resolving disputes through reciprocal exchanges that occur in formal bargaining or in international interactions (Keohane 1986 ). Shared expectations, even in changing institutional contexts, facilitate coordination as the negotiators proceed from early conceptual discussions to later bargaining and decision making. Negotiating stages have been shown to be useful for depicting complex trade negotiations (Cameron and Tomlin 2000) and multilateral environmental talks (Druckman 1993) . They also give negotiators more control over the process that includes creating the conditions for turning points that move the process from one stage to another.
This discussion distinguishes between external or exogenous and internal or endogenous influences on turning points. Progress in security talks depends more on the influence of factors outside or more distant from the negotiation process. The progression of trade and environmental or political talks depends more on the influence of factors inside or closer to the process, such as procedures orchestrated and ideas put forth by the negotiators. This distinction can be stated as hypotheses: (a) turning points are precipitated by external events or interventions in negotiations over security issues, and (b) turning points are precipitated by such internal processes as procedural changes or new substantive concepts in negotiations over trade or political issues. An attempt is made to evaluate these hypotheses in a comparative context. In this study, a larger sampling of cases was analyzed than in any of the previous studies of turning points.
The remainder of the article is organized into several sections. The next section describes the methods used for analysis. It is divided into several parts. The first part consists of a discussion of the case-based, process-tracing methodology used to identify turning points. This is followed by a description of the sample of cases used in the analysis and the comparative-analysis framework, including the coding procedures. The results are presented next and followed by a discussion of implications for the hypotheses and the analysis framework as well as some next steps. The article concludes with an extension of the framework to an analysis of 11 cases of domestic negotiations in the airlines industry.
METHOD CASE CHRONOLOGIES: PROCESS TRACING
Turning points are understood in relation to a chronology of events through the course of a negotiation. The case chronology contains most of the information needed to analyze turning points. First, a departure must be observed and coded. It is identified in relation to earlier trends and may be more or less abrupt. Second, precipitants must be identified either within or outside of the process. These can be procedural or substantive decisions that occur in a proximate relation to the observed departure. They can also be external events to which the negotiating parties respond. They are identified through "backward tracing" from the departure. Third, the consequences of the departure are recorded in terms of movement toward or away from agreement. Progress toward an agreement, indicated also by stage transitions, is regarded as being deescalatory, especially if it resolves an impasse. Movement away from agreement, which may consist of an impasse or crisis, is coded as an escalation of the conflict. By distinguishing between immediate (proximal) and longer term (distal) consequences, it is possible to project the path through future turning points leading toward or away from agreement.
When viewed in terms of the complete chronology of a negotiation, a turningpoints analysis can be construed as a form of process tracing. Following Bennett and George (forthcoming), process tracing is an attempt to identify the causal chain that proceeds from precipitating (independent variables) to consequent events or outcomes. The emphasis placed on causation renders process tracing as more than a historical description of a sequence of events. It attempts to infer causation within cases and, as such, is similar to time-series analysis. It differs from the experimental logic of inferring cause from similar between-case (group) comparisons, referred to as the method of controlled comparison (Faure 1994 ). The path being traced proceeds from precipitating events to process departures to immediate and then later consequences that lead to an outcome. This within-case analysis can, however, be extended to comparisons between cases. By categorizing diverse cases in terms of issue area (security, trade, or political negotiations), paths from different cases can be compared. The cases used for the analysis are described in the next section. The mechanics for process tracing are described below in the section on comparative analysis.
THE CASES
The data set consists of 34 cases drawn mostly from the February 1999 compendium of Pew Case Studies in International Affairs (30 of the 34 cases). The Pew cases were selected according to a stratified random sampling frame with replacement. The strata were region and type of negotiation. An attempt was made to represent the regions of the world in rough proportion to the distribution of regions in the universe of cases: the sample distribution is Africa (3 cases), Asia (7), North America (3), Latin America (3), Europe (10), Middle East (2), and global (2). An attempt was also made to represent the types of negotiations in nearly equal numbers: security (10 cases), trade (9), and political (11). A constraint on the sampling procedure was the requirement that each case provides sufficient chronological detail about the process for analysis. When a randomly chosen case provided insufficient detail, it was replaced by another randomly chosen case within the same strata, or, in two instances, other sources were used to provide sufficient information (cases 8 and 29). By also including in the sample the previous case studies of turning points, the number of security cases increased to 12 (10 Pew cases plus base-rights and INF cases).The North American Free Trade case appears as a Pew case study but was coded from the information provided by Tomlin (1989) Table 1 series is the largest pool of case studies in international negotiations available, showing considerable diversity in topic and geographical region. A fourth reason is that they are more descriptive than analytic, although not the kind of raw material that would be presented by transcripts of discussions.5
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
The framework for analyzing turning points consists of three variables: precipitants, departures in the process, and consequences. These variables are features of negotiation as it occurs in a wide variety of cases. They are intended for comparative analysis. One goal is to discover patterns that transcend specific cases. Another is to evaluate the relationship between the framework's variables, including the hypothesized relationship between types of negotiation and precipitants. Both analyses contribute to theory development. Of course, generality is achieved at the cost of a less detailed analysis of individual cases. By moving from the case-specific language used by authors of case studies to a general conceptual language used by theorists, it is possible to discern similarities and dissimilarities between the cases. By doing individual case and comparative analyses, we can strike a balance between the kinds of historical analyses that emphasize uniqueness and those that seek general patterns. Each case was coded in terms of the framework's variables as follows.
Type of negotiation. Based on the Pew Case Studies in International Affairs (1999, 66-70) compendium subject index, the cases were categorized by issue area as security, political/environmental, or trade/economic. These categories were used as strata in the sampling frame. Security negotiations included cases on defense, strategic policy making, arms control, and war termination. Political negotiations included international (bilateral or multilateral) relationships, conflict management and resolution, global resources, energy, the environment, and international law and organizations. Trade or economic negotiations included issues concerning economic development, money and finance, trade and investment, and science and technology development.
Precipitants. Distinguishing between factors inside and outside the negotiations, precipitants were categorized as procedural (inside), substantive (inside), or external (outside). Procedural factors are defined as decisions made to change the structure or format of the talks, including formality, working committees, venue, and exposure to the media. Substantive factors consist primarily of new ideas or concepts introduced by one or more of the negotiating parties, including the way proposals are packaged for discussion, frameworks for discussing the issues, and new ways of thinking about or conceptualizing the issues. The emphasis is on the issues and proposals rather than the structure or format of the talks. External factors are events that occur outside of the negotiations, including both policy or leadership changes within one or more of the countries represented (proximal events) and third-party interventions by nonnegotiating parties or events that occur elsewhere with possible global implications (distal events). The external precipitants refer often to the larger policy and relational contexts within which the negotiation process is embedded.
Process departures (turning points). The distinction made here is between more or less abrupt changes in the ongoing negotiating process, both of which are considered turning points. Abrupt changes or turning points are sudden departures from a pattern of give-and-take and include interim or final agreements or deadlocks as well as unexpected transitions from one stage to another, notably from proposal exchanges to a willingness to settle that marks an endgame process. Less abrupt changes or turning points include new proposals (as precipitants) that alter the discussions somewhat or adjust the terms of trade and somewhat predictable stage transitions. These kinds of process departures follow the precipitants and are distinguished from them. The difference is that precipitants are the procedural suggestions made, statements of new ideas, or events that occur, whereas the departures are the decisions made by a party or parties to agree or reject a proposed change or idea as well as the transitions that occur from one stage to another.
Consequences. Some departures lead to positive consequences, others to negative results. Positive consequences refer primarily to progress toward or the achievement of agreements that are the outcome of the negotiation. Negative consequences refer to movement away from agreements toward impasses. The former are depicted as deescalatory consequences ("upturns" in a trend); the latter are escalations in the process ("downturns" in a trend). As part of the three-part framework, consequences follow immediately from the departures (t) and are distinguished from them. The departure is the reaction to the precipitant, whereas the consequence is the direction of the talks toward or away from positive outcomes. Extending the consequences further in time, we also analyze the events that follow in the next turning-point sequence (t + 1). By doing so, we can evaluate the extent to which escalation precedes or follows deescalation.
Coding procedures and the mechanics of cross-tabulation and process-tracing analyses are described in the sections to follow. The sequence for this example can be depicted as follows: trade negotiation -> procedural precipitant -abrupt departure -+ de-escalatory consequence. This sequence is a tracing of the causes and consequences of a turning point in these negotiations.
Cross-tabulations. The analyses were designed to uncover relationships among the parts of the framework. These relationships contribute to the development of paths from the type of negotiation to consequences of the departures. One issue, however, is the unit of analysis. There are more turning points than there are cases. To the extent that the turning points that occur within a case are not independent-later turning points are influenced by earlier ones-they cannot be counted as separate instances. Thus, the case, not the turning point, is the unit of analysis. Each analysis is based on an n of 34 cases.7 This is done by calculating percentages on a case-by-case basis: for example, the number of external (procedural, substantive) precipitants divided by the total number of precipitants in that case or the number of abrupt departures (or escalatory consequences) relative to all departures (or consequences) in that case. For some analyses, the frequencies (number of external or internal precipitants), rather than percentages, were used to facilitate statistical analysis.
The analyses consisted of assessing relationships among the parts of the analytical framework: type of negotiation (trade, political, security), precipitant (substantive, procedural, external), process departure (abrupt, nonabrupt), and consequence (escalatory or de-escalatory). Relationships are represented by cross-tabulations between pairs of variables. The cross-tabulation of type of negotiation by precipitant consists of the average percentage of the total in each precipitant category by case (how many substantive, procedural, and external precipitants for trade, political, and security cases, respectively). This analysis provides an evaluation of the hypotheses stated above. Other cross-tabulations included precipitants by departure, precipitants by consequences, and departure by consequences. Each of these cross-tabulations sums to 1.00 for percentages or to 34 for frequencies. In addition, the sequence of consequences from one turning point (at time t) to another (at time t + 1) was analyzed. The question of interest is whether a previous escalation is followed by another escalation or a de-escalation. These analyses provided the basis for the process tracing. Paths from the type of negotiation to consequences at t and, for a number of cases, at t + 1 were developed for each of the three types of negotiation cases.
Process tracing. Paths were traced for each case. This was done by ascertaining the primary type of precipitant (occurring in at least 50% of the turning points for that case), the primary type of departure (whether abrupt or nonabrupt departures occurred in at least 50% of the turning points), immediate consequence (as escalatory or deescalatory in at least 50% of the turning points), and later consequence if more than 7. As noted above, some analyses were calculated without the three cases used in previous analyses. The n for these analyses was 31. one turning point occurred (as escalatory or de-escalatory in at least 50% of the following turning points). The paths are shown for each of the cases in the Results section. These case paths were then aggregated for each type of negotiation: security, political, and trade. The aggregation procedure consisted simply of a count of the number of types of precipitants (or departures, consequences) relative to the total number for all those types of cases. For example, if 7 of 10 departures for the trade cases are abrupt, then this would be the designated type of departure in a typical trade path. For some paths, an equal number of procedural and substantive (or external) precipitants result in a shared designation. This analysis provides another basis for comparing the types of negotiations.
RESULTS
This section is divided into three parts. First, the results of the cross-tabulations are reported along with the frequency of cases in which mediation was used. Second, the findings from the analysis of sequences of consequences are shown. And third, the case-by-case process tracings are displayed.
CROSS-TABULATIONS
Type of negotiation by precipitant. As shown in Table 2 , most of the precipitants in the security negotiation cases were external (78%). The fewest external precipitants occurred in political negotiations (19%). Somewhat less than half (44%) of the precipitants for political talks and somewhat more than a third (39%) for trade talks were substantive. Fewer procedural precipitants occurred in those negotiations (30% and 37% in trade and political cases). Trade and political negotiations were characterized primarily by precipitants that occurred inside the talks (substantive + procedural: 69% and 81%, respectively), whereas security talks were characterized by outside precipitants (78%). Frequencies of cases in each category where the precipitant was primarily (more than 50% of the turning points within the case) inside (substantive or procedural) or outside (external) the negotiation are shown in Table 3 .8 The statistical relationship between type of negotiation and type of precipitant is highly significant (X2 = 15.36, df= 2, p < .001, Cramer coefficient [C] = .67). Particularly notable is the observation that the primary precipitant in 12 of the 13 security cases was external. This finding provides strong support for the hypotheses stated above, namely, that the type of negotiation can be distinguished in terms of the kinds of precipitants that produce turning points. Support for the hypotheses is obtained also when the 3 earlier turning-point cases are excluded from the samples of security (cases 6 and 7) and trade (case 29) cases, reducing the total number of cases to 31. The relationship between type of negotiation and type of precipitant is highly significant (X2 = 12.91, df= 2, p < .01, C= .65).
Two trade cases had an equal number of inside and outside precipitants. A decision was made to
assign one case to the inside category (case 25) and the other to the outside category (case 27). Type of negotiation by precipitant by departure. As shown in Table 4 , the external precipitants that occurred in security negotiations led to the most abrupt departures in the process. Fifty percent of the precipitants in the security cases were external followed by abrupt departures. None of the other precipitants within types of cases approached this number: the closest were the 27% of substantive precipitants in the trade cases that were followed by abrupt departures, the 26% of substantive precipitants in the political cases, and the 24% of external precipitants in security cases that were followed by nonabrupt departures. Furthermore, the largest discrepancy between abrupt and nonabrupt departures occurred for the external precipitants in the security cases (differences of 26% for external vs. 3% for substantive and 2% for procedural). The discrepancies between abrupt and nonabrupt departures that followed external precipitants for trade and political talks were 14% and 9%, respectively. For all types of cases, the external precipitants were followed roughly twice as often by abrupt than by nonabrupt departures. More abrupt departures occurred also following substantive precipitants in the trade cases (a difference of 18%), whereas more nonabrupt departures occurred following substantive precipitants in the political cases (a difference of 8%).
Precipitant and departure by consequence. Although 75% of the consequences showed progress toward agreement (75% were de-escalatory), more than half of the escalations occurred in response to external precipitants (see Table 5 ). Two thirds of these escalations followed abrupt departures (67% were abrupt, 33% nonabrupt), as shown in Table 6 . Although there were also more de-escalations following abrupt Another analysis provides further insight into the relationship between external precipitants and escalations. External precipitants can be divided into those that involve the negotiating parties (e.g., policy changes or a leadership succession) and those that involve parties or events that are not part of the negotiation (e.g., decisions made by international organizations or agreements reached in other negotiating venues). Of interest is whether the escalations occur primarily after events closer to or more distant from the process. Twenty-eight percent of the escalations occurred following a departure in response to an external precipitant involving one or more of the parties; about 40% occurred when the precipitant was further removed from the process. A ratio of about 3:1 (de-escalations:escalations) for negotiating parties compares to a ratio of 3:2 (de-escalations:escalations) for parties or events further removed. Thus, escalations are somewhat more likely to occur in response to departures that follow more distant events.
The role of third parties. Third-party intervention or mediation is one type of external precipitant. It occurred in 9 of the 34 cases, 7 of which were negotiations over 
SEQUENCE OF CONSEQUENCES
The sequence from a consequence at time t to the next consequence at t + 1 is shown for the cases with more than one turning point in Figure 1 Table 2 (.39, .30, and .31, respectively). Only 3 of the 10 departures were nonabrupt, and 3 of the cases had escalatory consequences at time t. In each case of escalation, however, a de-escalation followed, consistent with the security paths traced above. Thus, although about two thirds of the precipitants are likely to be inside the negotiations, it is difficult to identify a primary precipitant. A typical path, then, may take the following form:
trade negotiation -> inside precipitant -> abrupt departure --de-escalation at time t -de-escalation at time t + 1.
In summary, the paths make evident a difference between the security cases on one hand and the political and trade cases on the other. In 12 of the 13 security cases, external precipitants led to abrupt departures in the process. In 8 of these cases, the departures had short-term and longer term de-escalatory consequences. Inside precipitants were predominant in both the political and trade cases, leading mostly (but not always) to abrupt departures, the consequences of which were primarily de-escalatory. These findings support the hypothesized relationship between the type of negotiation and the kinds of factors that precipitate the occurrence of turning points.
DISCUSSION
The results provide strong confirmation for the hypothesized relationships between type of negotiation and the factors that precipitate turning points. Both the cross-tabulations and the case-by-case process tracings make evident that the null hypothesis of no difference between types of negotiation is rejected. This supports the findings obtained in the earlier analyses of turning points in which the two security cases were driven by external events, whereas the turning points in the trade and environmental cases were precipitated by internal factors. The comparative analyses presented in this article increase the generality of these findings beyond a small number of cases. (Significant findings were obtained both when the earlier cases were included and when they were excluded from the sample.) They also suggest that negotiations are likely to be influenced by the larger contexts in which they occur. One feature of the larger context is the extent to which professional negotiators have shared expectations for the way a process moves toward an outcome. One indicator of shared expectations is the frequency of escalations during the process: more than half of the total number of escalations (14 of 25) occurred in the security cases.
Security negotiators made few concessions and offered few proposals for agreements. One possible explanation for this behavior is that, unlike their counterparts in the trade and political areas, security decision makers are sensitive to possible losses rather than potential gains, making them less likely to take risks. Progress in these talks was shown to depend less on their own initiatives than on such external interventions as mediation (7 of the 13 security cases) or outside events (5 of the 13 cases). This pattern is likely to play a role in hindering the development of the sorts of cooperative regimes that are prevalent in the trade and political domains. Indeed, the difficulties involved in establishing security regimes are evident (see, e.g., Jervis 1983). And, then, the lack of a cooperative regime serves to reinforce the very behaviors that prevent the emergence of such institutions. In contrast, trade and environmental regimes facilitate coordination in negotiations, which, in turn, bolster the strength of these cooperative regimes. This circular relationship between negotiating behavior and international regime formation or sustenance has implications for the way that microlevel processes interact with macrolevel structures. (See for more on this relationship.)
Most of the consequences of the process departures (75%) were de-escalatory in the sense of showing progress toward reaching agreements. This finding is consistent with the idea that turning points in negotiation are benchmarks of progress. This was evident in each of the earlier case studies: for example, Gorbachev's and Reagan's decisions in INF galvanized the process toward agreement; high-level interim activities in the Spain-United States base-rights talks led to a framework agreement; and the various substantive and political decisions in the North American Free Trade prenegotiation discussions led to formal negotiations. To the extent that the cases used in this analysis are representative of a larger universe of cases, we can conclude that most precipitants, whether internal or external to the process, serve to move a negotiation in the direction of agreements. To the extent that parties create these precipitants, they have control over the velocity of the process leading toward or away from agreement. Yet to be explored is the relationship between types of agreements reached and the kinds of precipitants that produce departures in the process.
The analyses suggest that the negotiating parties have a role in bringing about turning points. Our distinction between external and internal precipitants is relevant. In the political and trade cases, process departures were precipitated by either substantive or procedural activities that are largely controlled by the parties. In fact, it can be argued that these are attempts made by the parties to control the process to avoid the intrusion of outside influences. Format changes (procedures) and new ideas (substantive) are intended to move the process toward agreement when this is the goal of the negotiation. But they can also be used to subvert a negotiation process to avoid an undesirable agreement or prolong the process in the interest of obtaining side effects (Ikle 1964) . Attempts made to prolong a process for its own sake have been more characteristic of security negotiations than either the political or trade cases. The uncertainty concerning the consequences of any new agreement in this area makes the parties reluctant to bring about departures that either escalate or de-escalate the process. Thus, the process is more vulnerable to outside influences as we have documented in this analysis. Further analyses should illuminate how parties attempt to control the process by precipitating certain types of departures.
Of particular interest are the later consequences of escalatory reactions to departures that occurred in 25% of the turning points. Similar to Druckman's (1986) earlier finding, the negotiating parties-although not necessarily the negotiators themselves-confronted a crisis or setback and reversed it to produce progress in the upcoming rounds. Most of the reversals (7 of 9) were produced by such external interventions as third-party actions in the security cases. In contrast, few external interventions were sought to reverse an escalation in the political and trade cases: 8 of 10 were engineered from inside the talks as either substantive or procedural decisions. By separating precipitants from consequences and tracing the path between them, we can distinguish between various actions taken in different types of negotiations (as precipitants) to reverse course (as consequences of departures).
More generally, these analyses reveal research opportunities and expose some limitations. With regard to opportunities, the study provides a framework for analysis of change in negotiation. By construing turning points in terms of a causal sequence, the framework disentangles driving factors (precipitants) from process and consequences. By defining each of these parts as variables, it guides coding decisions and provides reproducible procedures. Going beyond the single case, the framework is shown to facilitate comparative research. One next step would be to perform controlled comparisons on a smaller, more homogeneous set of cases. Expanding the sampling frame, the framework can be used to analyze other types of cases, including negotiations that occur within countries, as described in the next section, and those that are nongovernmental or unofficial.
Another opportunity is to consider the larger context of conflict between the parties. That context includes the types of conflicts, structures, and experiences with the negotiation process or issues. With regard to conflict, it would be interesting to ask whether the negotiation process and framework discussed in this article apply also to the sorts of identity issues that have arisen during the past decade. Do they apply to conflicts, the source of which is less interest-or value-based and more cognitive in the sense of differences over the means to achieving shared goals? With regard to structures, we might ask whether the process is different for the more institutionalized negotiations that take place in the context of the United Nations than for those conducted outside of this kind of organizational setting. With regard to experience, we might ascertain whether changes have occurred in the professionalization or efficiency of the process. Such changes may have implications for control over the velocity of the process and, thus, the way that precipitating events are introduced.
The analysis illuminates the well-known trade-off between large and small n studies. In our search for generality, we have forfeited a degree of depth for breadth. In this study, the heterogeneous-cases strategy was used. The kinds of hypotheses evaluated required that a variety of types of negotiations be represented in the sample. Although generality is an advantage of this sampling strategy, it is difficult to specify a universe of cases from which this sample (or the entire set of Pew cases) was drawn. A population of negotiation cases could be defined only from documented materials. A cataloguing of these materials would miss the many undocumented or classified cases that have occurred, referred to by metaanalysts as the "file-drawer" problem (Rosenthal 1984) .
Escalation in negotiation turns on events, referred to here as precipitants, that may occur within or outside the negotiating process. They were shown in this analysis to have consequences for paths toward or away from agreements. Different kinds of paths were diagnosed for each of the three types of cases in this sample. Capturing change in the negotiation process, the paths highlight the dynamic aspects of international negotiation. Of interest, however, is the question of generality or relevance to negotiations that occur in the domestic arena. A preliminary attempt is made in the next section to apply the framework to a set of domestic cases.
EXTENSION AND GENERALIZATION
An effort was made to ascertain whether the paths obtained for the international cases are similar to paths that unfold in domestic talks. Detailed chronologies were developed from current information about each of 11 cases of negotiation between the unions representing airline mechanics, flight attendants, or pilots and the airline companies. Each chronology was coded by two analysts working independently in terms of the framework's variables, precipitants, process departures, and consequences.9 The paths traced for each case were aggregated to identify a primary precipitant (occurring in more than 50% of the turning points), primary type of departure (more than 50% abrupt or nonabrupt), and immediate and later consequences as primarily escalatory or de-escalatory.
An example of a case is the negotiation between the mechanics' union (IAM) and TWA. The chronology for this case extended from February 1997, when contract talks began, to June 1999, when the 30-day cooling-off period ended and the union was faced with the choice of striking or signing an agreement. An agreement was reached to accept the terms on the table subject to review and renegotiation in 18 months. Between these dates, the talks moved from one impasse to another. The 25 events highlighted in the chronology were coded in terms of 9 turning points, most of which consisted of requests by the union to the National Mediation Board to declare impasses. Seven of the 9 precipitants in this case were procedural, 7 of the 9 process departures were abrupt, and 7 of the 9 consequences were escalatory. The pattern for this case is similar to those found for the other 10 airline cases analyzed.
In 7 of the 11 cases, the primary precipitant (in more than 50% of the turning points) was procedural. The cases were evenly divided between primarily abrupt and nonabrupt departures. And in 9 of the 11 cases, the short-and long-term consequences were clearly escalatory. In fact, escalatory consequences continued for several time periods in the chronologies before a settlement was achieved. A typical path, aggregated across the 11 cases, is as follows: airline labor negotiations -> procedural precipitant -abrupt or nonabrupt departure -> escalation at time t -escalation at time t + 1 -> escalation at time t + 2 -de-escalation at time t + n.
Unlike any of the types of international cases analyzed above, these talks were characterized by repeated escalations before a settlement was reached.?1 This pattern may be due in large part to the institutional context in which the negotiations are conducted. Both the unions and the companies have incentives to prolong the talks. For the unions, the threat of a strike is the only way to get the companies to agree on a new contract; they are able to strike only after all mediation efforts made by the National Mediation Board have been exhausted. For the companies, the longer the negotiation, the longer the employees are stuck with the old, less expensive contract. This sort of domestic, legal-institutional structure does not have a counterpart in the international system. International regimes (in the trade or environmental areas) do not provide similar incentives for prolonging negotiations through repeated escalatory tactics. An exception, however, may be the relatively infrequent occurrence of negotiations, usually on 
